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Abstract
Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key
suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design.
To ﬁll this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision
strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two super-
vision techniques are combined: continuous regulator intervention and
random audits. Random audit technologies diﬀer as to quality and
cost. Our design ensures good management without excessive super-
vision costs, through a gradual adjustment of supervision eﬀort to the
bank's ﬁnancial health. We also consider preventive supervision in a
setting where audits can be delegated to an independent audit agency,
showing how to induce agency compliance with regulatory instructions
in the least costly way.
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1 Introduction
"The regulators substituted a more detailed look at the banks with just
looking at outputs from models. They got lazy."
Select Committee on Economic Aﬀairs Report (2009)
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has proved once again the need for eﬀective pre-
ventive banking supervision. If regulators had been able to detect potential
threats at early stages, many of the negative consequences of bank distress
could have been avoided. To some extent, this inability to anticipate prob-
lems can be explained by an excessive regulatory reliance on the outcomes
of stress-testing models, and the concomitant lack of deeper analysis of bank
management practices. The lightening progress of information technology
has signiﬁcantly contributed to this tendency, so that business intelligence
has largely replaced human intelligence in the supervisory process. However,
another plausible explanation for the lack of eﬀective supervision in the pre-
crisis period is the unclear oﬃcial instructions on the supervision process. In
fact, even though Basel II suggests implementing early supervisory measures
for the troubled banks, it does not specify their design: the regulator is left
to draw information from the ﬁnancial markets, taking supervisory measures
based on the warning signals they send.
Indeed, in practice, the regulator is faced with numerous challenges re-
lated to supervision design. One of the basic problems is how to determine
the optimal frequency and duration of supervision events. On the one hand,
higher frequency makes banks more inclined to conform with regulatory rules,
and longer duration of regulatory interventions improves the quality of reg-
ulatory information, thereby, potentially resulting in better design of any
corrective measures. On the other hand, more supervision has a cost and
regulatory resources are limited. Another problem is the choice of super-
vision technology. The quality of supervision technology strongly depends
on its cost. For instance, on-site inspection of a bank would be much more
costly than external balance sheet examination, but would provide a better
picture of the bank's ﬁnancial health, through better access to reliable in-
formation. To sum up, the fundamental issue of supervision design can be
stated as follows: how can eﬀective supervision be ensured without excessive
supervision spending?
Surprisingly, very few studies address the design of preventive supervision.
Most authors1 consider supervision as an adjunct to capital regulation, ig-
noring its preventive eﬀect. Nevertheless, appropriate theoretical background
1See, for instance, Merton (1978), Dangl and Lehar (2002), Bhattacharya et al. (2002).
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can be found in Décamps et al. (2004) and Rochet (2004). Both papers sug-
gest realizing continuous regulatory interventions in order to combat moral
hazard in bank asset management.2 However, pure continuous intervention
may be too costly, and the same incentive eﬀect on banks can be achieved at
lower cost through the use of random audits as a part of supervision process.
In this study we propose an alternative preventive supervision strategy
that relies on a combination of two supervision techniques: random audits
and continuous intervention. By gradually adjusting the level of supervision
in line with the bank's ﬁnancial health, this strategy allows the regulator
to induce the bank to adopt good management practice without excessive
supervision costs.
First, we consider the benchmark case, where the regulator has a single
perfect audit technology at his disposal. We show that combining random
audits with continuous intervention allows the regulator to prevent moral
hazard in the bank and immediately yields signiﬁcant cost savings compared
to the pure intervention strategy. Moreover, supervision costs can be kept
to a minimum through optimal choice of random audit frequency. Ideally,
audit frequency should be continuously adjusted to the ﬁnancial health of
the bank, increasing with any depreciation in the value of bank assets. How-
ever, in practice it may be quite diﬃcult to ensure credible commitment to
this supervision strategy. Given that audit frequency is contingent on bank
asset value, the bank would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to estimate real audit frequency.
Inability to make this internal assessment will lead to a lack of conﬁdence in
the regulatory strategy, destroying its incentive eﬀect. To avoid this, we pro-
pose a practical solution involving several random audit regions with stepwise
adjustable audit frequency.
Second, we consider the case where the regulator owns a continuum of
audit technologies that diﬀer in quality and cost. We show that, generally,
there is no need to use the perfect (and most expensive) audit technology
all the time, as the same incentive eﬀect on the bank can be achieved with
lower audit quality, and therefore at lower cost. Thus, given the option of
adjusting audit frequency, it appears optimal to maintain only the audit
technology that delivers the lowest "cost/quality" ratio.
Another current challenge to supervisory practice addressed in this study
is the delegation of supervisory functions. Basel II actively encourages par-
ticipation by external audit ﬁrms in the supervisory process, but there is no
clear guidance on contracts. We allow for a setting where audit technology is
delegated to an independent audit agency which can provide better quality
audits at the same cost, but whose eﬀort level is unobservable by the regu-
2Intervention can be interpreted as temporary regulator administration of the bank.
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lator. In this context the regulator is faced with a problem of double moral
hazard: given that lower audit quality implies lower cost, the agency may
be tempted to shirk its duty. As a result, the bank will lose the incentive
to maintain good management, which will destroy the preventive eﬀect of
supervision.
To eliminate double moral hazard, the regulator needs to oﬀer the agency
a contract containing incentives to promote good management in the bank.
The basic idea behind this contract design is to link agency welfare to bank
ﬁnancial health. We show that the agency's choice of audit eﬀort depends
on the contract's continuation value, which represents the current expected
value of all future proﬁts that the agency can extract from the contract.
Thus, the regulator can induce the bank to good management at minimum
cost, by providing the agency the minimum incentive contract continuation
value. In the end, it is precisely this minimum incentive contract continuation
value that conditions the overall design of incentive supervision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
literature. Section 3 presents the concept of preventive supervision. Section
4 examines the optimal supervision design in the nondelegation framework.
In Section 5 we discuss the optimal supervision strategy in a setting where
random audit technology can be delegated to an independent audit agency.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
2 Literature review
The literature can be divided into two strands oﬀering diﬀerent views
on the role of supervision. According to the traditional view, supervision is
used to reinforce capital regulation. In fact, many studies (see, for instance,
Rochet (1992), Hellmann et al. (2000), Fries et al. (1997)) argue that even
risk-based capital requirements, if implemented alone, are insuﬃcient to curb
the excessive risk-taking propensity of banks. Consequently, the regulator
needs to use additional tools as a reinforcement. The most explicit argument
for assigning this role to supervision is provided in Merton (1977). Examining
regulator liabilities under an option-pricing approach, he shows that it is
possible to mitigate excessive risk-taking incentives for banks by reducing
the time between regulatory inspections. Given the preceding result, Merton
(1978) introduces supervision in the form of the random audit. This design
has been adopted by many studies in the same ﬁeld. For example, Dangl
and Lehar (2002) examine the combined eﬀect of capital requirements and
random audits on risk-taking in banks. They show that the risk-weight
capital regulation of Basel II requires less audit eﬀort than the building-block
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approach of Basel I. Bhattacharya et al. (2002) ﬁnd that higher random audit
frequency makes it possible to reduce minimum capital requirements. Milne
and Whalley (2001) show a positive relationship between audit frequency
and capital buﬀer. Finally, Elizalde (2007) applies a risk-sensitive concept
of capital requirements to supervisory process and shows that riskier banks
should be audited more frequently.
None of the above papers, however, raises the question of optimal audit
frequency, although this directly aﬀects supervision costs. They also con-
sider audit technology as perfect. Within a non-random audit framework,
however, Pages and Santos (2001) deﬁne the optimal time between regula-
tory interventions, comparing a gain from immediate bank closure and the
expected gain from a postponed closure decision. Whereas Andersen and
Harr (2008) make the quality of audit technology increasing on costly audit
eﬀort and show that, under growing competition in the banking sector, the
regulator will optimally choose lower audit quality.
A second strand of the literature on supervision asserts its incentive ef-
fect on management technology in banks. Based on Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994), this approach sets aside the excessive risk-taking issue and proceeds
from the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management. In this view,
moral hazard implies a socially ineﬃcient choice of management technology.
It arises when bank management technology is unobservable from outside. In
this context, supervision serves to detect management quality and to impose
early corrective measures if necessary. Consistent with this idea, Décamps et
al. (2004) interpret moral hazard as the irreversible decision by the bank to
cease costly monitoring of assets. To prevent moral hazard, two regulatory
solutions are possible. The ﬁrst is to introduce minimum capital require-
ments that will prevent the bad management choice. However, this would
impose stricter regulatory closure rules on banks. The second solution is to
complement the existing closure rules by continuous regulator intervention.
Intervention should cover the whole region where moral hazard arises, in or-
der to prevent bad bank management. Taking this concept a step further,
Rochet (2004) considers reversible management technology and takes into ac-
count supervision costs, showing the existence of an optimal combination of
closure thresholds and intervention thresholds that maximizes social welfare.
Our study continues in the vein of the second strand of the literature,
seeking the optimal preventive supervision design. As using continuous in-
tervention throughout is too costly, we partially replace it with random audits
while still eliminating moral hazard. However, in contrast to the random-
audit literature cited above, we consider random audits as the regulatory
incentive tool which will completely eliminate misbehavior in the bank. Our
study also explores the optimal choice of both audit frequency and audit
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quality.
On the question of delegating audit technology to an independent audit
agency, we refer to the literature on optimal contracts in the continuous-
time principal-agent framework. Generally, this literature considers a setting
where the principal delegates some stochastic production technology to the
agent. In this case, the optimal contract should specify the agent's eﬀort and
remuneration. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that, for exponential
utility function and single terminal payoﬀ, the optimal contract will linearly
depend on aggregated outcome. Cvitanic et al. (2009) consider a general
form of utility function. They ﬁnd that the optimal contract is non-linear
in this case, but also depends on the ﬁnal outcome value. Williams (2009)
considers continuous agent rewards and shows that the optimal contract can
be speciﬁed by two adjoint state processes: promised utility and marginal
cost of agent consumption. Working in a similar setting, Sannikov (2008)
builds the optimal contract on a single state variable  the agent continuation
value which represents the agent expected utility. He ﬁnds that the agent
can be retired in two cases: either when his continuation value falls to zero
or when it becomes suﬃciently large, making it too costly for the principal
to compensate the agent for his eﬀort.
Our study, too, seeks the optimal contract between the regulator (the
principal) and the audit agency (the agent). But the nature of the problem
we consider is quite diﬀerent: we deal with a tripartite framework where the
moral hazard of the agency automatically implies the moral hazard of the
bank. Consequently, the choice of the optimal audit eﬀort will be constrained
by the need to create incentives for the bank. Thus, in our model the optimal
audit eﬀort determines the incentive-compatible contract continuation value,
the latter being used to derive the optimal compensation scheme. It should be
noted that the problem of double moral hazard was studied in Strausz (1996)
in a one-period discrete-time game. However, he allows for two incentive
contracts (one for the independent supervisor and one for the agent) and takes
the quality of monitoring technology as being independent of monitoring
eﬀort.
3 The model
We consider the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management and
construct our model based on Rochet (2004). First, we brieﬂy recall the
modeling background. Then, we present our concept of mixed supervision.
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3.1 Moral hazard in bank asset management
Consider a risk-neutral environment with two agents, a bank and a reg-
ulator, discounting their future at rate r. The bank is ﬁnanced by deposits,
D, fully insured by the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The deposits are
continuously repaid with coupon rD.
The bank's asset value evolves following a continuous-time process:
dxt = µxtdt+ σxtdWt, (1)
where µ is the expected asset return rate per unit of time, σ is the asset
return volatility and {Wt}t≥0 is a standard Wiener process.3
Bank assets continuously generate cash-ﬂow bxt until the moment of bank
liquidation. Since a large part of bank assets consists of loans, the bank's
asset performance entirely depends on the borrowers' productive technology,
unobservable by the bank. To ensure the high expected asset return µ = µG,
the bank managers need to make a costly monitoring eﬀort,4 spending a
constant amount γr per unit of time. In the absence of monitoring eﬀort,
asset quality deteriorates and the expected asset return decreases to µB < µG.
Hereafter, we employ the term good management technology to indicate the
presence of asset monitoring eﬀort and the term bad management technology
otherwise. Management technology is reversible: managers can switch from
good management to bad and vice versa. To focus on the moral hazard
problem, we assume that monitoring eﬀort does not aﬀect asset volatility,
i.e., σ remains constant under both management technologies. However, the
model can easily be extended to a case where asset volatilities are diﬀerent.
Liquidation of a bank occurs when its asset value hits the regulator clo-
sure threshold xR. We assume that, because of the incomplete transferability
of private bank information to a new owner, the resale market value of assets
at the moment of liquidation, λx/(r−µ), is lower than their economic value,
x/(r−µ). Thus, given µB < µG, bad management will impose higher liabili-
ties on DIF in the case of bank liquidation. We also consider λ > b/(r−µB)
to ensure that liquidation of the bank is better than perpetual bank continua-
tion under bad management. In such a context, bad management technology
appears socially ineﬃcient, and therefore its use should be prevented by the
regulator.
Rochet (2004) has shown that, under limited liability, managers will op-
timally choose bad management when the bank's asset value becomes rel-
3We assume µ− 1/2σ2 > 0.
4There is no agency problem, i.e., bank managers act in the best interests of sharehold-
ers.
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atively small. Thus, the regulator can set an optimal closure rule x∗R that
would prevent the bad management choice:5
x∗R =
(−β2(D + γ) + γr/∆µ
1− β2
)(
r − µG
b
)
(2)
where β2 is a negative root of 1/2σ
2β2 + (µG − 1/2σ2)β = r.
However, liquidation threshold x∗R can be too high, potentially leading
to a large number of bank closures. This makes x∗R costly to implement
in practice. In this study we consider an arbitrary6 regulatory closure rule
xR < x
∗
R that creates the conditions for moral hazard. We intend to show
how the regulator can prevent moral hazard by means of optimally-designed
supervision.
3.2 Mixed supervision strategy as a regulatory response
In order to ensure preventive supervision without excessive supervision
costs, we propose adjusting the strictness of supervision to the bank's ﬁnan-
cial health. This idea underlies a mixed supervision strategy that combines
two supervision techniques: random audits and continuous regulator inter-
vention. The random audit implies a spot check on the management process
in a bank. Audit events follow a Poisson process with frequency ψ(x) and
carry the cost αcr per audit. Regulatory intervention can be interpreted as
a temporary regulatory administration, during which the regulator tries to
extract the bank from the distress. In contrast to the random audit, regu-
latory intervention may last for some time, carrying instantaneous cost cr
per unit of time. We assume that instantaneous audit costs do not exceed
instantaneous costs of continuous intervention, i.e., α ≤ 1.7
The concept of a mixed supervision strategy is presented by Fig. 1. For
a given closure rule xR, the regulator should set two supervision thresholds
(their design is discussed below), audit threshold xA and intervention thresh-
old xI , in such a way that the interval [xR, xA] would cover the whole moral
hazard region. It can easily be shown that it is always optimal to implement
random audit technology when the bank's asset value is not too low, and
to undertake continuous intervention in the neighborhood of the liquidation
threshold. Thus, xR < xI < xA.
5We generalize the result of Rochet (2004) for b 6= r − µG.
6It is also possible to endogenize the closure rule, maximizing social welfare (see Ro-
chet(2004)).
7The case α > 1 is feasible as well, but would lead to low audit intensity.
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Figure 1: Concept of mixed supervision
We assume that the regulator knows the bank's asset value.8 As long as
x ≥ xA, he remains inactive. In the region [xI , xA) he implements random
audits in order to check the management technology employed in the bank. If
bad management is revealed during the audit, the bank will be liquidated, i.e.,
shareholders will be deprived of equity. In the region [xR, xI) the regulator
undertakes intervention in order to maintain good management in the bank.
Intervention continues until either the bank's asset value is restored (x ≥ xI)
or decreases to liquidation point xR.
Now consider the design of supervision thresholds. Recall that the main
aim of the regulator is to maintain good asset management in the bank. The
bank managers maximize the bank's equity value. At each moment of time
they optimally choose the eﬀort level et, where:
et =
{
1 good management technology
0 bad management technology
We introduce operator A(e) such that:
A(e)f(x) = 1/2σ2x2f ′′(x) + (µB + ∆µe)xf ′(x)− rf(x), (3)
where ∆µ = µG − µB and f(x) is any contingent claim.
Then, the optimization program of the bank managers can be written as:
max
et∈{0,1}
{A(et)E(xt) + bxt − rD − γret} = 0, (4)
where E(xt) denotes the bank's equity value.
Consequently, managers will choose good management technology when
∆µxE ′G(x) ≥ γr, (5)
8This assumption stems from the eﬃcient-market hypothesis. It would be interesting to
consider in further research a setting with imperfect market information, where regulator
and market agents can improve information content. For instance, Lehar et al. (2007)
show that supervision eﬀort may reduce incentives for market agents to monitor bank
fundamentals, making market signals less informative.
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where EG(x) (deﬁned in Appendix A.1) denotes the bank's equity value under
good management.
Expression (5) shows that, in the absence of supervision, a switch to
bad management would be optimal when the expected instantaneous loss of
equity value becomes less than instantaneous monitoring costs. Moreover,
as the lower bank asset value results in lower "costs" for the bad technol-
ogy choice (∆µxE ′G(x) is increasing on x), we conclude that moral hazard
increases with depreciation of a bank's asset value.
Let xA denote the bank asset value that provides equality in (5). In the
absence of supervision, bank managers will maintain good management tech-
nology for x ≥ xA and choose bad management for x < xA. Consequently,
any audit threshold lower than xA will raise moral hazard, while any audit
threshold higher than xA will incur useless random audit costs. Thus, for the
rest of the paper, the audit threshold is set at xA.
Anticipating moral hazard for x < xA, the regulator will start performing
random audits below the audit threshold. To focus on the incentive eﬀect
of random audits, we consider here that audit technology is perfect, i.e.,
it always reveals the true management technology employed by the bank.9
Therefore, by choosing bad management on x < xA, bank managers can
lose equity value with probability ψ(x)dt in a small period of time dt. This
increases the expected instantaneous costs of a bad management choice and
modiﬁes managers' optimization program as follows:
max
et∈{0,1}
{A(et)E(xt) + bxt − rD − γret + ψ(xt)E(xt)(et − 1)} = 0, (6)
where x < xA. Solving this problem yields the following incentive-compatibility
constraint:
∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)EG(x) ≥ γr (7)
Let xI(ψ) denote the bank asset value that ensures equality in (7). Note
that random audits allow the regulator to induce the bank to use good man-
agement practice when x ∈ [xI(ψ), xA). When x ∈ [xR, xI(ψ)) the random
audit eﬀort becomes insuﬃcient to create incentives and regulatory interven-
tion becomes necessary to ensure continuing good management. As the left
part of (7) is increasing on ψ(x), the feasible set of inspection thresholds will
be given by xI ∈ [xI(ψ), xA]. Thus, under a mixed supervision strategy with
audit threshold xA and inspection threshold xI ∈ [xI(ψ), xA], the bank will
never use bad management technology, i.e., supervision will have a preventive
eﬀect.
9In Section 4.2 we examine supervision design under imperfect audit quality.
10
To conclude this section, we consider the total costs of mixed supervision.
Their current value represents the expected discounted value of future reg-
ulatory spending (i.e., the total continuous intervention and random audit
costs), conditional on the current bank asset value x0 ≥ xA:
C(x0) = E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rt(crIxt∈[xR,xI) + ψ(xt)αcrIxt∈[xI ,xA))dt
]
, (8)
where τR denotes the ﬁrst time when the bank's asset value reaches regulatory
closure threshold xR and I is an indicator function.
Note that C(x0) can be also presented as the expected cost of the pure
continuous intervention minus a cost gain from random audits:
C(x0) = E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rtcrIxt∈[xR,xA)dt
]
−E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rtcr(1− αψ(xt))Ixt∈[xI ,xA)dt
]
(9)
This representation makes it possible to capture a crucial feature of mixed
supervision:
Lemma 1 For any audit frequency ψ ≤ 1/α, mixed supervision reduces su-
pervision costs when compared to pure continuous intervention.
Indeed, condition ψ(x) ≤ 1/α implies that the expected instantaneous
audit costs ψ(x)αcr do not exceed the instantaneous costs of continuous
intervention, cr. This will ensure an immediate cost gain from mixed super-
vision as compared to the pure continuous intervention strategy.
4 Optimal preventive supervision
This section discusses the optimal design of a mixed supervision strategy.
First, we examine a benchmark case which implies a single perfect audit tech-
nology and we consider three diﬀerent random audit set-ups: with constant,
continuously adjustable and stepwise adjustable audit frequency. The audit
set-up with continuously adjustable audit frequency allows for the most eﬃ-
cient design of preventive supervision, since it ensures the lowest supervision
costs. However, in practice, banks have diﬃculty estimating continuously ad-
justed audit frequency. For this reason, we propose a practice-relevant solu-
tion that implies several random audit regions, with audit frequency constant
in each audit region but potentially diﬀering from region to region. Second,
we construct the optimal supervision design for a setting with a continuum
of audit technologies.
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4.1 Optimal mixed supervision with perfect audit
technology: benchmark case
Let us ﬁrst examine the benchmark case, where the regulator has a single
perfect audit technology. Under perfect audit technology, bad management
is always detectable during random audits. In such a context, the regula-
tory problem is to choose a function ψ(x), x ∈ [xI , xA) and the inspection
threshold xI that will induce good management in the bank with minimum
expected supervision costs:
Min
ψ(x),xI
C(x0)
s.t. ∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)EG(x) ≥ γr, ∀x ∈ [xI , xA)
where C(x0) is given by (8).
4.1.1 Constant audit frequency
We start with a simple set-up where the regulator keeps audit frequency
constant over the whole random audit region. Given any arbitrary audit fre-
quency ψ, the optimal inspection threshold results from the binding incentive
constraint of the bank, i.e., xI = xI(ψ). Indeed, any xI > xI(ψ) would gen-
erate excessive continuous intervention costs, while bank incentives can be
created by random audits alone. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of both parts of
(7) on ψ, we obtain the following:
Lemma 2 Inspection threshold xI(ψ) is decreasing on ψ.
Thus, the solution of the above maximization program will be completely
determined by the optimal audit frequency. However, since the inspection
threshold depends on ψ, the impact of audit frequency on supervision costs is
ambiguous. A higher random audit frequency would allow the regulator to set
a lower inspection threshold and, thereby, to reduce the costs of continuous
intervention. But this would extend the random audit region, raising the
total random audit costs.
In the absence of an analytical solution for ψ, we resort to numerical sim-
ulations in order to illustrate the cost gain from the optimally designed mixed
supervision. Simulations are based on the parameter values from Table 1.10
The optimal audit frequency obtained varies from 0.16 to 0.24 depending on
10This parameter set is calibrated to maintain a reasonable balance between spending
and gains, as well as to satisfy a condition of Rochet (2004), under which moral hazard is
possible: γD <
(1−β2)
λβ2
b
r−µG − 1.
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Table 1: Parameter set
Parameter Value Parameter Value
r 0.04 σ 0.25
µG 0.025 λ 0.7
µB 0.015 b 0.02
γ 0.06 α 1
c 0.04 D 1
Instantaneous asset return gap is taken as 1%. To beneﬁt from this technology gain, the bank should be
charged by monitoring costs γr that constitute 24% of the gain. Supervision costs are less than asset
monitoring costs and amount to 16% of technology gain. Random audit cost coeﬃcient α is set at 1 in
order to equalize instantaneous audit costs and instantaneous intervention costs.
xR, which approximately corresponds to 5-6 audits per year. The cost gain
generated by optimal mixed supervision as compared to the pure continu-
ous intervention strategy (where xI = xA) varies from 53% to 74%, which
explicitly conﬁrms a signiﬁcant cost advantage of mixed supervision.
4.1.2 Continuously adjustable audit frequency
The second audit set-up allows for continuous adjustment of audit fre-
quency to bank asset value. In this case, minimum supervision costs will be
ensured by an audit frequency which makes the incentive-compatibility con-
straint (7) binding, hereafter denoted as ψB(x). First, note that ψB(x) will
deliver the minimum audit costs, while maintaining bank incentives for good
management practice. Second, as the bank becomes less and less inclined to
maintain good management when its asset value goes down, ψB(x) will in-
crease with depreciation of x. According to Lemma 1, the maximum feasible
value it can attain is 1/α. But equality ψB(xI) = 1/α also yields the lowest
incentive-compatible inspection threshold, thereby ensuring the lowest total
continuous intervention costs. Then we can state:11
Proposition 1 Under a single perfect audit technology, the optimal design
of mixed supervision implies:
• a continuously adjusted audit frequency on x ∈ [xBI , xA):
ψB(x) = (rγ −∆µxE ′G(x))/EG(x) (10)
• an inspection threshold xBI : ψB(xBI ) = 1/α.
11The proof is omitted.
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However, continuous adjustment of audit frequency may lead to some
problems in practice. First, continuous adjustment requires up to date and
reliable information about the bank's asset value. In reality, although the
regulator has access to various information sources, the probability of inac-
curate data is rather high. Moreover, even when data is reliable, we cannot
rule out information delay. Yet when audit frequency is determined on the
basis of inaccurate data, it may be insuﬃcient to maintain bank incentives.
Second, it is easier to commit to a simple incentive mechanism that banks
can clearly understand. A more sophisticated regulatory strategy risks be-
ing misunderstood and therefore not producing the required incentive eﬀect.
In this context, a compromise solution might involve several random audit
regions, with audit frequency varying from region to region.
4.1.3 Stepwise adjustable audit frequency
Consider n random audit regions [xI , x2),[x2, x3),..., [xn, xA), where audit
frequencies {ψi}i=1..n are constant over each region. In order to homogenize
notation, denote x1 = xI and xn+1 = xA. Regulatory thresholds x1, .., xn
can be either endogenous (i.e., resulting from a regulatory cost-minimization
program) or exogenous. Thus, the optimal audit frequencies result from
the binding incentive-compatibility constraint on each audit region: ψi =
ψB(xi), i = 1..n. Indeed, any ψi < ψ
B(xi) would be insuﬃcient to create
incentives for good management on region [xi, xi+1), while any ψi > ψ
B(xi)
would incur useless audit costs. Obviously, ψi is stepwise decreasing with the
bank's asset value.
Regulatory thresholds, deﬁning audit regions, can be set in accordance
with the rating classiﬁcations of international rating agencies. An example
of a possible supervision strategy with stepwise-adjustable audit frequency
is provided by Fig. 2. Given exogenous regulatory thresholds xI , x2 and
x3, continuously adjusted audit frequency (a thick dotted line) is used to
specify the optimal audit frequencies for each random audit region. Thus,
healthy banks (with x ≥ xA) can be free of any supervision. The lower the
rating assessment, the more frequent audits should be. Finally, for banks
whose asset value is close to the liquidation threshold, continuous regulator
intervention becomes inevitable.
4.2 Optimal mixed supervision under a continuum of
audit technologies
In the previous section we discussed preventive supervision under the
perfect audit technology. However, in practice audit quality varies depending
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Figure 2: Mixed supervision with stepwise adjustable audit frequency
on many factors, such as number of supervisory staﬀ involved, professional
skills and remuneration of supervisors, scale of examination, audit technique
employed. For example, the regulator can examine the bank's accounting,
relying on the compulsory bank reports and involving a minimum of staﬀ.
Alternatively, a high-skilled audit team can realize on-site investigation of
the internal management process in the diﬀerent departments. Obviously,
the latter audit technology would provide a better estimation of the bank's
ﬁnancial health, but would require larger supervisory resources and greater
spending.
In this section we investigate the optimal supervision strategy in a setting
where the regulator has many diﬀerent audit technologies at his disposal and
can continuously adjust both audit frequency and audit quality over the audit
region. Denote T = [α, α] a continuum of audit technologies which diﬀer as
to quality and cost αcr. Audit quality depends on audit eﬀort, α, and is
measured by probability p(α) ∈ [0, 1] of uncovering bad management in the
bank, given that the bank operates under bad management technology.12
Function p(α) is concave and strictly increasing on α with p(α) = 0 and
p(α) = 1.
When audit quality is imperfect, the probability of detecting bad man-
agement in a small interval dt, given that bank managers have switched to
bad management technology, is reduced to ψp(α)dt. As audit quality is freely
12We assume that, if the bank operates under good management, the probability of
uncovering bad management technology as a result of an audit is zero.
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observable by bank managers, this will reduce their incentives to choose good
management as compared to the benchmark case. Thus, audit quality choice
becomes an additional supervisory tool that will aﬀect the optimal supervi-
sion design, and the new regulatory problem can be stated as follows:
Min
ψ(x),α(x),xI
C(x0)
s.t. ∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)p(α(x))EG(x) ≥ γr, ∀x ∈ [xI , xA)
We are looking for ψ(x), α(x) and xI that minimize the total expected
supervision costs, complying with the incentive-compatibility constraint of
the bank.13 Note that both instantaneous random audit costs and inspection
threshold are determined by α(x)ψ(x). Using the incentive-compatibility
constraint of the bank, we are able to present the optimal audit frequency as a
function of audit quality, ψ(x) = ψB(x)/p(α(x)). This representation shows
that instantaneous random audit costs are increasing with "cost/quality"
ratio α/p(α). But the inspection threshold, provided by αψ(x) = 1, is also
increasing with this ratio.
Proposition 2 Under a continuum of audit technologies and continuously
adjustable audit frequency, the optimal design of mixed supervision implies:
• a single audit quality α? = argmin α/p(α), α ∈ T ;
• a continuously adjusted audit frequency ψ?(x) = ψB(x)/p(α?);
• an inspection threshold x?I = [ψ?]−1(1/α?).
Note that in the particular case where the regulator has at his disposal
only two audit technologies to choose from randomly at each audit event,
it will be optimal to use a single audit technology throughout, since the
"cost/quality" ratio will be monotonic on α in this case.
We conclude this section with a brief illustration of the optimal super-
vision strategy in a discrete case with several random audit regions and
stepwise-adjustable audit frequency.
Example 1 Optimal supervision under stepwise-adjustable audit frequency.
13Note, that under constant audit frequency, the optimal audit quality results from the
binding incentive constraint of the bank and the problem solution is completely determined
by the optimal choice of random audit frequency.
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 As in practice it is easier to commit to a discrete supervision strategy, we
consider a random audit environment which allows for i = 1..n exogenously
ﬁxed audit regions. Audit frequencies ψi and audit technologies αi are sup-
posed to be constant for each audit region. Proceeding as in the continuous
case, it can easily be shown that the optimal audit quality is still given by
α? = argmin α/p(α), α ∈ T across all audit regions, while audit frequency
should be adjusted as follows:
ψi(xi) = ψ
B(xi)/p(α
?), i = 1..n (11)
where x1 = xI , xn+1 = xA and ψ
B(x) is given in (10).
Indeed, for any exogenous regulatory thresholds xi, i = 1..n, such a su-
pervision strategy would maintain the incentive constraint of the bank for
each audit region, incurring minimum supervision costs. It directly follows
from this result that, in the particular case with a single audit region and
constant audit quality, the optimal audit quality will be given by α? and the
optimal intervention threshold will result from α?ψ?(xI) = 1. 
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5 Optimal preventive supervision with
delegated random audits
So far we have assumed that the supervision process was entirely under-
taken by the regulator. Hereafter, we refer to that setting as the nondel-
egation framework. In the current section we consider the case where the
regulator is able to hire an independent audits agency to perform random
audits at the bank, but may still perform some audits himself.14
The agency is more eﬃcient in audit performance than the regulator:
under the same level of audit eﬀort α ∈ [α, α), the agency has a higher prob-
ability q(α) of uncovering bad management in the bank15 than the regulator,
i.e., q(α) > p(α) and q(α) = 1. Given that the audit eﬀort of the agency is
unobservable by the regulator, audit delegation leads to a problem of double
moral hazard: the audit agency may be tempted to shirk, enjoying instanta-
neous cost savings.16 As a result, the preventive eﬀect of supervision will be
destroyed: observing no audit eﬀort, the bank will adopt a bad management
technology. Therefore, in order to prevent moral hazard in the bank, it is
essential to prevent moral hazard in the agency. This can be realized through
an incentive contract that induces the agency to promote good management
in the bank. In other words, in a delegation framework, the regulator should
launch a "chain" of incentives: an incentive contract will induce the agency
to exert appropriate audit eﬀort, which will induce the bank to maintain
good management technology.
The aim of the regulator in the current setting is still to ensure good
management in the bank at the minimum supervision cost. However, now
an independent audit agency can replace the regulator, performing random
audits on the delegation region, hereafter termed [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), while
outside this region the regulator will follow the optimal supervision strategy
stated in Proposition 2. For any given delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA),
the contract with the independent audit agency should specify:
• (i) audit parameters α(x) and ψ(x);
• (ii) the asset-based remuneration R(x) ≥ α(x)cr that the agency will
receive at each audit event;17
14In contrast to random audits, continuous intervention can be performed only by the
regulator.
15If the bank really operates under bad management.
16We exclude the possibility of collusion between the agency and the bank.
17We assume that the agency has limited liability and will accept a contract only on
condition that each payment provides non-negative proﬁt.
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• (iii) a contract termination rule xT ≤ x, such that the contract with
the agency will expire when the bank's asset value reaches xT for the
ﬁrst time;18
• (iv) a lump-sum terminal payoﬀ RT ≥ 0 to the agency at the contract
termination date.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we examine
the agency's choice of audit eﬀort and outline a new regulatory problem.
Then, we determine the minimum incentive-compatible contract with the
agency and discuss the optimal supervision strategy in the nondelegation
framework.
5.1 Moral hazard in the agency and the new regulatory
problem
First, we consider the agency's choice of audit eﬀort, given any arbitrary
contract. The agency maximizes contract continuation value K(x) ≥ 0,
which is contingent on current bank asset value x and represents the total
expected value of future contract pay-oﬀs, net of audit costs:
K(x) = E
[∫ τT
0
e−rtψ(xt)(R(xt)− α(xt)cr)Ixt∈[x,x)dt+ e−rτTRT
]
, (12)
where τT is the ﬁrst time bank asset value reaches termination threshold xT .
Let us ﬁx a delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA). For any arbitrary au-
dit frequency ψ(x), we deﬁne the audit quality αψ(x) ∈ T that makes the
incentive constraint of bank binding:
αψ(x) = q
−1(ψB(x)/ψ(x)), x ∈ [x, x) (13)
where ψB(x) is given by (10).
The agency has two options: either to induce good management in the
bank, or to let the bank operate under bad management. In the interests
of maintaining good management in the bank, the agency will optimally use
audit quality αψ(x), as this induces the bank to maintain good management
technology, incurring minimum audit cost. Otherwise, the agency will not
exert audit eﬀort at all, since any α ∈ [α, αψ(x)) generates useless audit
cost, without creating any incentive eﬀect on the bank. The choice between
18Strictly speaking, the contract with the agency should specify retirement time τT .
However, as we are dealing with a stationary problem, τT represents the ﬁrst time the
bank's asset value reaches a termination threshold xT .
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these two options is driven by expected instantaneous cost savings on the
one hand and expected loss of contract continuation value on the other.
Indeed, by exerting no eﬀort during the audit, the agency saves the amount
αψ(x)cr. However, if it observes no audit eﬀort, the bank will switch to the
bad management technology that implies lower expected returns on assets
and, consequently, reduces the contract continuation value of the agency. We
can thus state the agency maximization problem as follows:
Max
ut∈{0,1}
{A(ut)K(xt) + ψ(xt)(R(xt)− utαψ(xt)cr)} = 0 (14)
where xt ∈ [x, x), A(ut) is given by (3), K(xT ) = RT and ut = 1 when the
agency chooses audit technology αψ(x).
Thus, the agency will use quality αψ(x), while the expected instantaneous
loss of contract continuation value, caused by the bad management in the
bank, will exceed the expected instantaneous cost savings:
∆µxK ′(x) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(x)cr, x ∈ [x, x) (15)
Taking into account this result, let us turn to the regulatory problem in
the delegation framework. On the one hand, delegation allows the regulator
to beneﬁt from the greater audit eﬃciency of the agency, saving on random
audit costs:
∆CAψ(x0) = E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rt(st − αψ(xt)ψ(xt))crIxt∈[x,x]dt
]
, (16)
where
st =
{
1 xt ∈ [xR, x?I ]
α?ψ?(xt) xt ∈ [x?I , xA]
and parameters x?I , α
?(xt), ψ
?(xt) are given by Proposition 2.
On the other hand, the regulator will have to bear the additional cost
of compensating the agency. Note that outside the delegation region, the
regulator will follow the supervision strategy that is optimal for the nondel-
egation framework. Then, for any x0 ≥ xA, the regulatory problem is to
maximize the gain from delegation, maintaining good management at the
bank through the incentive contract with the agency:19
Max
αψ(x),ψ(x),R(x),xT ,RT ,[x,x)
{∆CAψ(x0)−Kψ(x0)} ≥ 0
19Note that the regulator will never resort to delegation if ∆CAψ(x0) < Kψ(x0), as in
this case he can ensure preventive supervision by himself at lower cost.
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s.t.

∆µxK ′(x) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (ICA)
R(x) ≥ αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (PCA1)
RT ≥ 0 (PCA2)
where αψ(x) is given by (13), [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), ∆CAψ(x0) is given by (16)
and Kψ(x) is given by (12) for α(x) = αψ(x).
To design the optimal supervision strategy for the above regulatory prob-
lem, we proceed as follows. First, for any arbitrary [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), ψ(x) and
corresponding αψ(x), we specify an incentive compensation scheme that en-
sures the minimum incentive-compatible contract continuation value. Then,
we deﬁne the optimal audit parameters. Finally, we discuss the pattern of
the optimal supervision strategy in the delegation framework.
5.2 Optimal contract with the agency
Let us ﬁx any arbitrary delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA). For any audit
frequency ψ(x), we take audit quality αψ(x), given by (13). Thus, the regu-
latory problem is to ﬁnd the optimal compensation scheme {R(x), RT} and
termination rule xT ensuring the minimum Kψ(x0) ≥ 0, and simultaneously
satisfying constraints ICA, PCA1, PCA2. The regulator therefore needs
to ﬁnd the minimum incentive-compatible Kψ(x0) ≥ 0, which makes ICA
binding and satisﬁes PCA1 at the lower bound of the delegation region:
K∗ψ(x) = Kψ(x) +
cr
∆µ
(∫ x
x
ψ(y)αψ(y)
y
dy
)
, x ∈ [x, x) (17)
Naturally, the minimum feasibleK∗ψ(x) would be ensured by the minimum
constant Kψ(x) ≥ 0, which is chosen in such a way as to respect participa-
tion constraint PCA1. Replacing the minimum incentive K
∗
ψ(x) in (14) with
ut = 1, we can easily get incentive remuneration Rψ(x) and check the partic-
ipation constraint. Then, two cases are possible. If PCA1 is satisﬁed for any
arbitrary Kψ(x), it would be optimal to impose Kψ(x) = 0, which automati-
cally gives the solution for termination rule and terminal payoﬀ. Otherwise,
the minimum feasible Kψ(x) > 0 results from Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr, and we need
to determine the minimum incentive contract on x ∈ [xR, x) in order to ﬁnd
the optimal contract termination rule and terminal pay-oﬀ.
Proposition 3 For any [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA), the optimal incentive contract with
an independent audit agency implies:
• (i) audit parameters α?? = argmin
α∈T
α/q(α) and ψ??(x) = ψB(x)/q(α??);
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• (ii) per-audit remuneration Rψ??(x):
Rψ??(x) = α
??cr +
rK∗ψ??(x)
ψ??(x)
− α
??cr
∆µ
(
µG − 1
2
σ2 +
1
2
σ2x
∂ψ??(x)
∂x
)
• (iii) termination rule x??T = max {xR, x∗}, where x∗ ∈ [xR, x] is such
that K∗∗ψ??(x
∗) = 0, and terminal pay-oﬀ R??T = K
∗∗
ψ??(x
??
T ) ≥ 0, where:
K∗∗ψ??(x) =
ψ??(x)α??
β1 − β2
cr
∆µ
[(
x
x
)β1
−
(
x
x
)β2]
+
Kψ(x)
β1 − β2
[
β1
(
x
x
)β2
− β2
(
x
x
)β1]
,
(18)
for x ∈ [xR, x) and Kψ(x) : Rψ??(x) = α??cr.
Thus, the optimal audit parameters for the agency are determined in the
same manner as for the regulator, allowing for a higher technology frontier
q(α). The minimum incentive remuneration Rψ??(x) implies two compo-
nents: audit cost compensation, α??cr, and moral hazard rent, which makes
agency welfare contingent on bank ﬁnancial health and thus creates suﬃcient
incentives for good management in the bank.20
If the contract in not worthless at the moment of bank liquidation, i.e.,
K∗∗ψ??(xR) > 0, the regulator has to give the agency a positive terminal payoﬀ
R??T = K
∗∗
ψ??(xR) in order to compensate for the loss of potential proﬁts from
the contract if the bank had kept going. Otherwise, the contract termination
occurs at x∗ ∈ [xR, x] such that K∗∗ψ??(x∗) = 0, and the agency doesn't receive
any terminal payment. In the particular case, whenK∗ψ??(x) = 0, the contract
termination rule consides with a lower bound of the delegation region, i.e.,
x??T = x. We show in Appendix B that this is always the case when µ ≤ σ2:
Lemma 3 For µ ≤ σ2, x??T = x and R??T = 0.
Once we have the optimal incentive contract for any [x, x), the optimal
design of supervision strategy will be determined by the x that ensures the
maximal gain from delegation.21 In fact, for any x ∈ [xR, xA), the optimal x
will be given by the critical bank asset value, for which instantaneous costs of
delegated random audit become equal to instantaneous costs of non-delegated
supervision.
20The convexity of ψB(x) does not allow us to identify the exact pattern of moral
hazard rent. However, we ﬁnd that moral hazard rent increases with bank asset value
under suﬃcient condition σ2 ≤ (2µ+ r)/3.
21The optimal x can be found through numerical simulations. Note that x ≥ xFBI ,
where xFBI : α
??ψ??(x) = 1 denotes the optimal lower bound of the delegation region
(and, simultaneously, the optimal inspection threshold) in the First Best case, where the
audit eﬀorts of the agency are freely observable by the regulator.
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Lemma 4 The regulator will never resort to delegation in the left neighbor-
hood of the audit threshold, i.e., x < xA.
The point is that, when bank asset value is in the left neighborhood of
xA, optimal audit frequency tends to zero. As audit events become too rare,
remuneration for each audit event needs to be generous enough to provide
the agency with suﬃcient incentive for the appropriate audit eﬀort. Conse-
quently, in the left neighborhood of xA, it will be less costly for the regula-
tor to ensure preventive supervision himself, rather than to compensate the
agency for the eﬀort. Then, there are two feasible alternatives:
• x is given by ψ??(x)Rψ??(x) = α?ψ?(x)cr: this is always the case if
x ≥ x?I , or if x < x?I but ψ??(x)Rψ??(x) < cr for ∀x < x?I ;
• x is given by ψ??(x)Rψ??(x) = cr: this is the case if x < x?I and there
is at least one x < x?I such that ψ
??(x)Rψ??(x) > cr.
We conclude this section by providing an illustration of the optimal in-
centive contract in a discrete setting with a single audit technology α?? and
stepwise-adjustable audit frequency.
Example 2 Optimal incentive contract in a discrete case.
 Consider the audit set-up with stepwise adjustable audit frequency, where
delegation region [x, x) consists of n exogenous intervals and the agency owns
a single audit technology α??. To homogenize notation, we denote x1 = x and
xn+1 = x. Then, the minimum incentive compatible contract continuation
value on [x, x) can be written as follows:
K∗ψ??(x) =
cr
∆µ
α??
q(α??)
(
i−1∑
k=1
ψB(xk) ln(xk+1/xk) + ψ
B(xi) ln(x/xi) + ψ
B(x1)ρ
)
,
(19)
where ρ = (µG − 1/2σ2)/r and x ∈ [xi, xi+1), i = 1..(n− 1).
ReplacingK∗ψ??(x) in ODE (14) with ut = 1, we obtain minimal incentive-
compatible remuneration:
Rψ??(x) = α
??cr
(1/2σ2 − µB)
∆µ
+
rK∗ψ??(x)
ψ??(xi)
, (20)
where x ∈ [xi, xi+1), i = 1..n and K∗ψ??(x) is given by (19).
Thus, the minimum incentive remuneration in a discrete set-up consists
of the ﬁxed reward and the variable bonus, increasing with bank asset value.
Note that in this particular case we have K∗ψ??(x) > 0 and, consequently,
x??T < x.
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6 Conclusion
This paper outlines a preventive supervision strategy to combat moral
hazard in bank asset management. Using an incentive-based approach, our
design combines continuous intervention with random audits to reduce su-
pervision costs. We show in this context that, under a single audit tech-
nology, minimum supervision costs can be ensured through the continuous
adjustment of audit frequency to a bank's ﬁnancial health. Moreover, the
cost-saving eﬀect of mixed supervision becomes even greater when the regu-
lator can use a continuum of audit technologies, diﬀering in quality and cost.
We obtain proof that, given a large choice of audit technologies, it will be
optimal to use a single audit technology throughout, the one with the mini-
mum "cost/quality" ratio, continuously increasing audit frequency when the
bank's asset value decreases.
We also explore a setting where the random audit can be delegated to an
independent audit agency, able to ensure the same audit quality at lower cost
than the regulator. We focus on the case where the audit eﬀort of the agency
is unobservable by the regulator, so that he needs to motivate the agency to
maintain good management in the bank through an incentive compensation
scheme with embedded moral hazard rent. As moral hazard rent makes it
too costly to compensate the agency for eﬀort when the bank's asset value is
relatively high, it would be optimal to implement only a partial delegation
of the random audits. In other words, delegation should not fully replace
the regulatory audit. Partial delegation may be beneﬁcial for the regulator,
allowing total supervision costs to be reduced due to greater eﬃciency of the
audit agency.
However, delegation raises the question of who should remunerate the in-
dependent audit agency: the audited bank or the regulator? In Swiss banking
supervision practice, an audit ﬁrm involved in the supervisory process is re-
munerated by the audited bank. At ﬁrst glance, this rule would appear to
allow the regulator to reduce supervision spending. However, the ﬁnancial
dependence of the audit ﬁrm on the bank may negatively impact audit qual-
ity: it creates favorable conditions for bank pressure and, under competition
in the audit market, may lead to greater indulgence by the audit ﬁrm towards
its auditee. In the context of our model, any decision on whether to transfer
the ﬁnancial burden of the audit to the bank or not will be driven by the
trade-oﬀ between incentive eﬀect and cost of supervision. If the regulator
provides the audit agency with audit instructions and makes the bank pay
for each audit event, given that these costs will reduce the incentive eﬀect
of random audits on the bank, the regulator will need to perform more in-
terventions in order to prevent bad management in the bank. This means
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higher intervention costs for the regulator. Thus, it might be cheaper for the
regulator to pay for the audits himself and perform less interventions, rather
than to charge the bank for audits but have to bear higher intervention costs.
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Appendix A. The evaluation of contingent claims
Let J be a claim, contingent on the non-tradable asset which evolves
according to (1). Let τ be its time to maturity and δ(xt) be a continuous
pay-oﬀ, conditional on the underlying asset value. In a risk-neutral world
the current value of the claim is equal to the expected value of its future
discounted pay-oﬀs, conditional on current asset value x:
J(x) = E
[∫ τ
0
e−rtδ(xt)dt+ e−rτJτ (xτ )
]
(A1)
According to standard techniques, a general solution of (A1) satisﬁes:
AJ(x) + δ(x) = 0, (A2)
where an operator A is deﬁned as:
AJ(x) = 1/2σ2x2J ′′(x) + µxJ ′(x)− rJ(x) (A3)
A.1. The bank's equity value
In the absence of supervision, the bank's equity value E(x) is driven by:
AEG(x) + bx− rD − γr = 0 under good management technology
AEB(x) + bx− rD = 0 under bad management technology
where G and B denote good and bad management technologies with
µ = µG and µ = µB respectively.
Under random audits, EG(x) remains unchangeable. Conversely, EB(x)
may incur a negative jump and thus follows:
AEB(x) + bx− rD − ψE(x) = 0 (A4)
Under a mixed supervision strategy, the bank will use good management
technology until its liquidation. Then, under a terminal condition E(xR) = 0,
the bank's equity value follows:
EG(x) = νGx−D − γ + (D + γ − νGxR) (x/xR)β2 , (A5)
where νG = b/(r − µG) and β2 is a negative root of:
1/2σ2β2 + (µG − 1/2σ2)β = r (A6)
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A.2. Supervision costs in the nondelegation case
For any given ψ(x), α(x) and xI , the total supervision costs C(x) in the
nondelegation framework are driven by the following ODE:
A C(x) = 0 when x ≥ xA
A C(x) + ψ(x)α(x)cr = 0 when x ∈ [xI , xA)
A C(x) + cr = 0 when x ∈ [xR, xI)
where C(x) is contingent on x under good management technology (µ = µG),
the operator A is given by (A4) and C(xR) = 0.
Consider the benchmark case where the regulator owns a single perfect
audit quality α and ψ = const. Using a limit condition limx→+∞C(x) = 0,
a terminal condition C(xR) = 0, value-matching and smooth-pasting condi-
tions at xA and xI , we get the following solution for x ≥ xA:
C(x) = k(ψ)xβ2 , (A7)
where a cost coeﬃcient k(ψ) is given by:
k(ψ) = k − (1− αψ)
c
[
β1(x
−β2
A − x−β2I )− β2xβ1−β2R (x−β1A − x−β1I )
]
β1 − β2 , (A8)
where k = c
β1−β2 (β1x
−β2
A − β2xβ1−β2R x−β1A ) − cx−β2R is a cost coeﬃcient of
the pure continuous intervention strategy proposed in Rochet (2004), and β1
is a positive root of (A6).
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Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
 Using expression (9) and Lemma 1, we rewrite the regulatory problem as
follows:
Max
α(x),ψ(x),xI
E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rtcr(1− α(xt)ψ(xt))Ixt∈[xI ,xA)dt
]
s.t. ∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)p(α(x))EG(x) ≥ γr, ∀x ∈ [xI , xA)
where x0 ≥ xA, α(x) ∈ T and ψ(x) ≤ 1/α.
The minimal incentive-compatible audit frequency is given by the binding
incentive-compatibility constraint of the bank:
ψ(x) = ψB(x)/p(α(x)), (B1)
where x ∈ [xI , xA), α ∈ T and ψB(x) is given by (10).
Then, instantaneous random audit costs are proportional to:
ψ(x)α = ψB(x)α(x)/p(α(x)) (B2)
As ψB(x) does not depend on audit quality, the minimal ψ(x)α will be
ensured by a single audit technology, the one with the minimum ratio α/p(α).
Let us consider the inspection threshold. For any arbitrary ψ and α,
the minimum incentive compatible xI is given by the binding incentive-
compatibility constraint. By Lemma 2, xI is increasing on ψ. Thus, the
lowest feasible inspection threshold results from: ψ(xI) = 1/α. Using (B3),
we can rewrite this equality as follows:
ψB(xI) = p(α(xI))/α(xI) (B3)
Therefore, a random audit technology with minimum α/p(α) also ensures
the lowest incentive-compatible inspection threshold. Then, the audit quality
α? such that:
α? = argmin
α∈T
α/p(α) (B4)
provides a maximum gain from random audits and thus ensures minimum
total supervision costs.
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Proof of Proposition 3
3.1. An incentive contract continuation value
 Let us ﬁx some delegation region [x, x) ∈ [xR, xA). For any ψ(x), we
consider an audit quality αψ(x) that makes the incentive constraint of the
bank binding:
∆µxE ′G(x) + ψ(x)q(αψ(x))EG(x) = γr, x ∈ [x, x) (B5)
where ψB(x) is given by (10).
Then, for any x0 ≥ xA, the regulatory problem can be rewritten as follows:
Min
R(x),RT ,xT
Kψ(x0) ≥ 0
s.t.

∆µxK ′(x) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (ICA)
R(x) ≥ αψ(x)cr, ∀x ∈ [x, x) (PCA1)
RT ≥ 0 (PCA2)
where αψ(x) is given by (B5).
For x ∈ [x, x) ∈ [xI , xA) the minimal incentive compatible contract con-
tinuation value is given by the binding ICA:
K∗ψ(x) = Kψ(x) +
cr
∆µ
(∫ x
x
ψ(y)αψ(y)
y
dy
)
, x ∈ [x, x) (B6)
where a constant Kψ(x) ≥ 0 is deﬁned below.
At the same time, K∗ψ(x) follows ODE:
A(1)K∗ψ(x) + ψ(x)(Rψ(x)− αψ(x)cr) = 0 (B7)
Replacing K∗ψ(x) from (B6) into (B7), we get an incentive remuneration:
Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr+
rK∗ψ(x)
ψ(x)
− cr
∆µ
(
ψ(x)αψ(x)(µG − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
σ2x
∂(ψ(x)αψ(x))
∂x
)
(B8)
We now need to ﬁndKψ(x) ≥ 0 that simultaneously minimizesK∗ψ(x) and
ensures a participation constraintRψ(x) ≥ αψ(x)cr for ∀x ∈ [x, x). Two cases
are possible. If the term in parenthesis in (B8) is negative, the participation
constraint will be respected throughout, so that the minimal K∗ψ(x) will be
ensured by Kψ(x) = 0.
22 Otherwise, the minimum K∗ψ(x) will be ensured by
22Consequently, this will imply Rψ(x) > αψ(x)cr.
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the minimal feasible Kψ(x) > 0 which results from Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr. Thus,
we have:
Kψ(x) = max
{
0;
cr
∆µ
(
ψ(x)αψ(x)(µG − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
σ2x
∂(ψ(x)αψ(x))
∂x
|x=x
)}
(B9)
3.2. A terminal payoﬀ and a termination rule
The minimal incentive-compatible terminal payoﬀ will be given by the con-
tract continuation value at the liquidation threshold, R??T = K
∗
ψ(x
??
T ), where
x??T is the optimal termination rule. Indeed, any RT > R
??
T incurs an exces-
sive compensation over the whole delegation region, while RT < R
??
T incurs
a discontinuity of the contract at x.
Naturally, when Kψ(x) = 0, we have x
??
T = x and R
??
T = 0.
Now let us consider the case when Kψ(x) > 0. Using the continuity of
K∗ψ(x) and K
∗
ψ
′(x) at x = x, we can derive the contract continuation value
for x < x:
K∗∗ψ (x) =
ψ(x)αψ(x)
β1 − β2
cr
∆µ
(xx
)β1
−
(
x
x
)β2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ Kψ(x)β1 − β2
β1(xx
)β2
− β2
(
x
x
)β1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 ,
(B10)
where Kψ(x) is given by Rψ(x) = αψ(x)cr.
Since Kψ(x) > 0, K
∗∗
ψ
′(x) > 0 for x < x and limx→0K∗∗ψ (x) = −∞, there
exists a unique x∗ ∈ [xR, x) such that K∗∗ψ (x∗) = 0. Thus, two cases are
possible: (i) if x∗ < xR, we have x??T = xR and R
??
T = K
∗∗
ψ (xR) > 0; (ii) if
x∗ > xR, we have x??T = x
∗ and R??T = 0.
3.3. Optimal audit parameters
Now, allowing for the preceding results, we need to determine the optimal
audit parameters ψ(x) and αψ(x) that ensure:
Max
αψ(x),ψ(x)
{∆CAψ(x0)−K∗ψ(x0)} ≥ 0, (B11)
for any x0 ≥ xA.
Since the pair ψ(x) and αψ(x) satisﬁes the binding incentive constraint
of the bank, we can express ψ(x) as follows:
ψ(x) = ψB(x)/q(αψ(x)), (B12)
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where ψB(x) is given by (10). Then, ∆CAψ(x0) can be rewritten as follows:
∆CAψ(x0) = E0
[∫ τR
0
e−rt
(
st − ψB(xt) αψ(xt)
q(αψ(xt))
)
crIxt∈[x,x]dt
]
, (B13)
where
st =
{
1 xt ∈ [xR, x?I ]
α?ψ?(xt) xt ∈ [x?I , xA]
and parameters x?I , α
?(xt), ψ
?(xt) are given in Proposition 2.
The minimal incentive K∗ψ(x0) is:
K∗ψ(x0) = Kψ(x)
(x0
x
)β2
=
(
c
∆µ
∫ x
x
αψ(y)
q(αψ(y))
ψB(y)
y
dy +Kψ(x)
)(x0
x
)β2
,
(B14)
where Kψ(x) is given by (B10) and β2 is a negative root of (A6).
Note that, for x > x, a constant Kψ(x) does not depend on audit param-
eters. Then, the solution of (B11) will be given by α?? = argmin
α∈T
α/q(α), as
it simultaneously maximizes ∆CAψ(x0) and minimizes the integrand in the
expression of K∗ψ(x0). Consequently, the optimal audit frequency is given by:
ψ??(x) = ψB(x)/q(α??). 
Proof of Lemma 3
 Let us show that x < xA. Replacing α?? and ψ??(x) into (B6) and (B8),
we obtain:
Rψ??(x) = α
??cr +
rK∗ψ??(x)
ψB(x)
− α
??cr
∆µ
(
µG − 1/2σ2 + 1/2σ2∂ψ
B(x)
∂x
x
ψB(x)
)
(B15)
Taking the ﬁrst derivative of ψB(x) on x, we get:
∂ψB(x)
∂x
= −∆µ(E
′
G(x) + xE
′′
G(x))
EG(x)
− ψB(x)E
′
G(x)
EG(x)
(B16)
Since ψB(xA) = 0, we obtain limx→xA−Rψ??(x) = +∞. Therefore, there
always exists a non-empty region [x, xA) where α
?ψ?(x) < Rψ??(x)ψ
??(x).
Thus, we have x < xA. 
Proof of Lemma 4
 Let us show that, for µ ≤ σ2, the minimal feasible Kψ??(x) = 0. Let
consider the sign of the term in parenthesis of expression (B8), allowing for
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the optimal audit parameters α??, ψ??(x) and any arbitrary x ∈ [xR, xA):
c
∆µ
α??
q(α??)
(
ψB(x)(µG − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
σ2x
∂ψB(x)
∂x
)
(B17)
This will be equivalent to consider the sign of function f(x) such that:
f(x) = x
∂ψB(x)
∂x
+
(µG − 1/2σ2)
1/2σ2
ψB(x) (B18)
Using (B16), we can rewrite f(x) as follows:
f(x) = −∆µx(E
′
G(x) + xE
′′
G(x))
EG(x)
− ψB(x)
(
xE ′G(x)
EG(x)
− (µG − 1/2σ
2)
1/2σ2
)
(B19)
Note that EG(x) is convex. Then, for xR and any x > xR we can state:
EG(x) ≤ EG(xR) + E ′G(x)(x− xR) ≤ EG(xR) + xE ′G(x) = xE ′G(x) (B20)
Since xE ′G(x)/EG(x) ≥ 1, for µG ≤ σ2 we have f(x) < 0, so the expression
(B17) is negatively signed for any x ∈ [xR, xA). According to (B9), we have
Kψ??(x) = 0. Then, x
??
T = x and R
??
T = 0. 
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